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Abstract 
New-right economists and many employers argue that an efficient labour market requires that an employer should face 
few constraints on the right to dismiss workers as such constraints limit the employer's flexibility to adapt to changes 
in the marketplace and may inhibit the employer in hiring new labour. Others argue that an employee is entitled to be 
treated fairly whenever their security of employment is in jeopardy. The latter perspective is the one that has received 
legal endorsement by both the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal. This paper will examine the way in which 
the Courts have applied this principle in situations where a worker has been dismissed because of redundancy. It will 
discuss legal developments in the area and comment on the extent to which the legal requirements may inhibit an 
employer' s decision making relating to reductions in its labour force. 
The economic restructming of the past decade has in-
volved massive numbers of redundancies. In the main this 
disruption to people's lives has been regarded as a cost of 
gaining increased flexibility in the labour market with 
scant attention having been paid to the cost to the individu-
als affected. Indeed social welfare and labour law changes 
have worsened fmther the position of those affected. Any 
suggestion that such workers deserve some degree of 
protection has been met by hostility from employer spokes-
persons and new-right economists. Those who support 
this position have argued that employment protection laws 
are one of the remaining obstacles in the way of a fully 
flexible labour rruutet (BrookJ 991 ). 
It is not my intention in this paper to explore the nature of 
these arguments. Instead the paper is primarily concerned 
with the state of the current law relating to redundancies 
and some possibilities for reform. The basic argument of 
those opposed to any labour market intervention should. 
however, be briefly mentioned. It appears to hinge on the 
argument that the costs of redundancy compensation, and 
indeed any restrictions on dismissing workers at will, are 
such as to deter employers hiring new or replacement 
labour. Hence employment protection hinders the fully 
efficient use of labour. More fundamentally such theories 
effectively exclude an obligation for an employer to act 
fairly, assume that labour is purely a commodity to be 
disposed of at will and take little or no account of the 
impact of tennination on employees. 
The hostility of employer groups to any form of employ-
ment protection has been apparent since the passage of the 
Employment Contracts Act and it has been argued that the 
failure of the Act to severely restrict employment protec-
' 
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tion was a major defect The most direct statement of the 
employer position is to be found in a joint paper by the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable and the Employers' Federa-
tion (NZ Business Roundtable, NZ Employers' Federa-
tion,l992). In that paper it was proposed that, in the 
absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, all em-
ployment protection be abolished except for a requirement 
to give two weeks notice of the tennination of employ-
ment 
This paper will discuss only redundancy terminations. In 
the case of other terminations Parliament has clearly 
decided that there should be protection against unjustified 
dismissal. I This paper will look at two aspects of the law 
on redundancy. The first are the situations in which the law 
potentially requires an employer to pay redundancy or 
other compensation to a dismissed employee. The second 
will consider the international labour standards on redun-
dancy dismis.sals and some areas where reform of the law 
might be justified. 
The obligation to pay redundancy compensa-
tion 
An employer's current liability to compensate a worker for 
redundancy is largely dependent on the terms of the 
contract of employment Most obviously if there is a 
specific term in the contract that term must be observed 
and can of course be enforced by legal action. According 
to the Department of Labour (1994) 45 percent of their 
surveyed contracts (covering 51 percent of workers) have 
either a substantive redundancy provision or refer to a 
separate agreement. A greater proportion, 71 percent, 
have a notice provision. It would seem reasonable to claim 
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that a substantial group of workezs have no legal entitle-
ment to redundancy compensation given that the depart-
ment of Labour surveys only larger collective contracts. 
The only other legal liability relates to the period of notice 
of tennination. The same Labour Department survey 
indicates that most workers have an average entitlement of 
about four weeks notice. The Depar bnent of Labour does 
not indicate how many, if any, contracts specifically ex-
clude redundancy compensation, a point that, as is ex-
plained below, may be of some importance. It should also 
be noted that redundancy compensation is not protected by 
insolvency legislation in most cases (as opposed to wages 
owing) and so if the employer is insolvent any redundancy 
agreement may be practically useless in the face of the 
priority claims of the large financial institutions. 
In the absence of a contractual entitlement to redundancy 
compensation a worker's only other options are to negoti-
ate compensation when made redundant, not the most 
propitious time for such negotiations, or to rely on the 
personal grievance provisions of the Employment Con-
tracts Act It is this latter course that is discussed below. 
It is now clear that the Employment Tnl>unal and Court can 
now award such compensation in limited circumstances. 
This development, which has been apparent since 1991, 
has caused considerable controversy. The basis for the 
criticism of the courts has been the argument noted above 
that it is a barrier to labour flexibility. In addition it is 
argued that the courts are acting contrary to the philosophy 
of the Employment Contracts Act, that the courts are 
interfering in the contract between the parties and that the 
developments create business uncertainty. Regardless of 
this, it is now clear that the courts have the power to make 
such awards. 
Redundancies and personal grievances: the 
Bilderbeck case 
Since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Brig house Ud 
v Bilderbeck 2 the law on dismissals has been considerably 
clarified. The fust point, that should be made, and which 
has been clear since the H ale3 case, is that a genuine 
commercial decision to make an employee redundant 
cannot be attacked through the personal grievance proce-
dure. In that case the Court of Appeal made it clear that the 
nature or wisdom of a commercial decision to make 
employees redundant was not a matter for the courts. 
Cooke, P said: 
this Court must now make it clear that an employer is 
entitled to make his business more efficient, as for 
example by automation, abandonment of unprofitable 
activities, re-organisation or other cost-saving steps, no 
matter whether or not the business would otherwise go 
to the wall. A worker does not have the right to 
continued employment if the business could be run more 
efficiently without him. The personal grievance provi-
sions ... should not be treated as derogating from the 
rights of employers to make management decisions 
genuinely on such grounds. Nor could it be right for the 
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Labour Court to substitute its own opinion as to the 
wisdom or the expediency of the employer's decision. 
When a dismissal is based on redundancy, it is the good 
faith of that basis and the fairness of the procedure 
followed that may fall to be examined on a complaint of 
unjustified dismissal ... the Court and the grievance com-
mittee cannot properly be concerned with an examina-
tion of the employer's accounts except so far as it bears 
on the true reason for dismissal (Hale : 155). 
This decision meant that the courts could only be con-
cerned with two issues; was the decision in fact a genuine 
commercial decision, and was it implemented in a manner 
that was procedurally fair. The fooner issue is not usually 
one that arises where a nwnber of redundancies are con-
templated. The. latter requirement arises, of course, from 
the principle that a dismissal that is procedurally unfair 
will constitute an unjustified dismissal regardless of the 
substantive nature of the decision. 
What then is the impact of the law of personal grievances 
on a decision to make a worker redundant? TheBilderbeck 
decision has now clarified the law and has essentially 
supported the approach adopted by the Employment Court 
since the Hale decision. The case did, however, reveal a 
clear division in the Court as to the extent procedural 
fairness is relevant in a redundancy dismissal. The first 
point that should be made, is that the Court as a whole 
agreed that a dismissal for redundancy must be carried out 
in a procedurally fair way. The dispute was not over this 
point but over whether compensation awarded for the 
failure to do so could extend to compensation for the 
redundancy itself, or, to put the matter another way, could 
procedural fairness include an obligation to pay redun-
dancy compensation. It was accepted by all the judges that 
a failure to give proper contractual notice or pay in lieu, 
conveying the decision in a way that is likely to cause 
additional distress and humiliation or that does not take 
into account the legitimate concerns of the employee are 
all possible grounds or compensation. For example, Gault 
J in his dissenting judgment, mentioned failure to provide 
assistance with alternative employment if that was appro-
priate or failure to give notice so as to maximise the 
opportunity to fmd other work. Richardson J, also dissent-
ing, said that procedural fairness may require "counselling 
and job assistance and retraining and that the employer 
also provide a cushion either by allowing additional time 
beyond the contractual period of notice or by payment in 
lieu ... 
The more controversial aspect of the case, and the previous 
decisions, is whether compensation can be awarded for the 
loss of the job as such. Following Bilderbeck the law now 
seems to recognise three possible situations. It must be 
stressed, as Cooke P made clear that there is no general 
right to compensation for redundancy as is the case in some 
countries but instead rights must be negotiated as part of 
the contract of employment. The three situations that are 
now recognised are: 
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(i) If the conttact has a clear provision providing for 
compensation for redundancy tbeo this }X'Ovision will be 
definitive of the matter. Having agreed to a fixed sum of 
compensation or a fonnula for its assessment one party 
cannot claim that it is procedurally tmfair when it is 
applied. 
(ii) The contract specifically provides that there is to be 
no compensation for redundancy. Again the conttact will 
be definitive unless there are exceptional circumstances. 
While such a contract may be tmfair, the w<X'ker will have 
specifically agreed to the position when employed. 
Of these two situations Cooke P said "If the contract 
contains an express provision and formula for redundancy 
compensation or (less likely) an express provision that 
there shall be no such compensation, no doubt it will 
govern. save possibly in very exceptional circumstances." 
but went on "Where no express provision applies, the 
ordinary pezsonal grievance procedure will be available ..... 
One or other of the above options is likely to be favoured 
by employers following Bilderbeck as they give certainty 
to the employer's position at least in respect of the redun-
dancy compensation aspect of the termination. Which 
option is achieved will of course depend on the relative 
bargaining position of the parties. 
(iii) The third situation is where the contract is silent on 
the matter. This was the situation in Bilderbeck. Sir 
Gordoo Bissoo made the point that if the contract was 
silent on redundancy it did not mean that no compensation 
was payable on redundancy. It merely meant that "The 
contract is simply silent on the issue leaving it open to be 
considered in the circumstances of each dismissal . ., It is in 
this situation that the courts may decide that compensation 
is payable. This decision is not inevitable and will be based 
on principles that have developed since the Hale decision. 
These principles were summarised by Chief Judge Goddard 
in the Employment Court' s decision in Bilderbeck as: 
1. Not every redundant employee is entitled to com-
pensation. 
2. In considering the overall duty of fair treatment 
incumbent on every employer. the Court may inquire 
whether the case cans for compensation for redun-
dancy. 
3. In the absence of a prior agreement to pay compen-
sation for redundancy the answer to the question 
whether the duty of fairness calls for payment will 
depend on circumstances such as -
the reason for the redundancy; 
the length of service of the employee; 
the period of notice of dismissal; 
the means of the employer to pay. 
4. Circumstances ca11ing for a compensatory payment 
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as part of the overall duty of fairness may arise in the 
absence of a prior agreement where, for example, an 
employer has voluntarily decided on redundancy as 
a cost-saving measure and can reasonably afford to 
pay compensation. 
5. The fact that some compensation has been offered 
[or, I would add, paid] is a relevant factor in deter-
mining whether, as a whole. the employer' s conduct 
has been fair and reasonable . ., 
These various factors must be balanced in each case and 
the Court has taken particular account of the employer's 
ability to pay especially where the redundancies are part of 
a restructuring or cost saving measure rather than for 
smvival or solvency reasons. 
The Bilderbeck case did reveal a strong division of opinion 
between the majority and minority opinions. Richardson 
J in particular argued strongly that the personal grievance 
provisions was not appropriately used to pay redundancy 
compensation. His views appear to have been strongly 
influenced by three factors. The first was a need for 
certainty in the law, secondly a view that if the conttact was 
silent the parties had decided not to allow for redundancy 
pay and that this agreement should not be overridden by 
the courts. Finally he was of the view that the question of 
redundancy pay was one for Parliament and not the courts. 
Richardson J can be criticised on several points. One 
particular point, and indeed the one central to the majority 
decision as well, is whether silence in the contract means 
that the issue of redundancy pay was fully considered by 
the parties. Richardson J appears to take the view that the 
negotiation of a contract of employment is a rational 
considered exercise involving various concessions as well 
as gains and seems to imply that the result will be an 
agreement addressing all relevant employment issues. His 
quote from the old Arbitration Court in NZ Related trades 
IUWvN?MC Ltd [l983] ACJ 233. which makes this point, 
in fact refers to a formal industrial negotiation. Since 1991 
this scenario has concerned a substantially reduced number 
of people, a situation which is especially likely to be so in 
smaller enterprises and with middle level employees. It is 
this type of employee that has featured in many of the 
redundancy cases. In such situations issues such as the 
tenn of employment may not have been fully considered 
and, equally significantly given the ongoing relational 
nature of the employment contract. the nature of the 
original position may have changed substantially since 
initial employment. It is such siruations that the flexible 
attitude adopted by the Employment Court is most appro-
priate. What may be fair after six months employment may 
not be so after a considerable period of employment and 
loyal service. 
The judgments in the Court of Appeal also reveal a strong 
division within the Court on the nature of the contractual 
relationship and on the possible role of the Court in relation 
to wider questions of social policy. The minority opinions, 
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and especially that of Richardson J, have clearly been 
attracted by elements of the law and economics rhetoric 
and a classical notion of contract They reject the idea of 
the courts having a strong policy role. Richardson J states 
"it is not open to the courts to construct an extra-statutory 
concept of social justice applicable in redundancy situa-
tions" and later that "The social and economic policy 
implications of possible redundancy regimes call for care-
ful analysis" and that they are "surely for the legislature 
and not the courts." 
The majority on the other hand appears to be more cogni-
sant of the need to deal with the realities of the employment 
relationship and to take account of inequalities of bargain-
ing power. Casey J in particular accepted this point. He 
explicitly stated that he could understand the desire of the 
Court and Tribunal to secure fair treattnent where employ-
ees, especially in smaller finns, have little ability to achieve 
satisfactory redundancy deals in their contracts and in a 
climate "engendered by restructwing and extensive dis-
missals, where redundancy payments have become com-
monplace in the major undertakings affected." Cooke P 
noted that the personal grievance provisions had not been 
cmtailed in respect of redundancy by the Employment 
Contracts Act in 1991 and commented that ''The emphasis 
on efficiency and market forces is thus accompanied and 
in a sense balanced by a reaffi.nnation and broadening of 
the scope of personal grievance remedies." He contrasted 
the lack of changes to the personal grievance provisions in 
the Employment Contracts Act with the changes to the 
dispute of rights procedure where restrictions had been 
imposed on the Court's power to detennine redundancy 
compensation in rights disputes. 
A standard for reform: the ILO convention 
and recommendation 
The Bilderbeck decision will allow compensation for 
redundancy in some limited situations. The standard on 
which compensation will be based appears, to be that of the 
fair and solvent employer. The case will not apply where 
there is a clear contractual term on redundancy compensa-
tion. The case thus does little to provide an equitable and 
rational system designed to provide a degree of protection 
and stability for employees where there is a redundancy. 
The basic philosophy of the present situation is that redun-
dancy is a matter for negotiation, ignoring of course 
respective industrial strength. Sensible labour market 
planning would suggest a more rationale approach to the 
problems caused by economic induced dismissals, at least 
to the extent of some minimwn standards. The remainder 
of the paper raises some of the issues that reform should 
address. 
One indicator of the minimwn level of reform that might 
be sought can be found in ll..O Convention 158 'Concern-
ing Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer' and the associated recommendation No 166. 
Convention 158 provides for: 
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(a) consultation with the worker's representatives. Such 
consultation should involve the provision of infonna-
tion on the reasons for the redundancy and its extent 
and is designed to allow discussions on the possibilities 
of reducing the tenninations and minimising their 
effect 
(b) notification to the 'competent authority! 
The Recommendation goes further in elaborating on the 
measures that should be taken to deal with and minimise 
the effects of redundancy terminations. The Recommen-
dation specifically refers to the need to balance the recom-
mended measures with the efficiency of the enterprise. 
The recommended measures include early consultation on 
technological change, the provision of relevant infonna-
tion to facilitate consultation, and measures to avert the 
need for terminations. It is recommended that these 
include reductions in hiring, natural reduction, retraining, 
restrictions on overtime and the like. The recommenda-
tion also stresses the need for selection to be made accord-
ing to criteria established in advance and which balance the 
interests of both the enterprise and the workers. 
The ll..O standards recognise the needforredundancies but 
provide for measures to help alleviate and minimise such 
terminations. They do not impose undue obligations on 
employers but they do attempt to ensure that workers 
interests are considered. To a large extent it is these 
principles that are at the heart of the Bilderbeck case. 
Nevertheless there is no general legislation in New Zea-
land to ensure that such considerations are taken into 
account, let alone that more concrete protection such as 
minimwn notice periods or some degree of compensation 
are provided. While there are those who support the 
expansion of the minimum code to include statutory pro-
visions for redundancy (Brosnan and Rea, 1991; W allis, 
PL, 1992 and the Labour Party, 1993) and even those who 
have suggested that a compulsory compensation scheme 
be developed to help those who lose jobs due to redun-
dancy (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980) their voices 
are largely ignored by those who worship the chimerical 
god of freedom of contract Apart from basic standards, 
problems can also arise because of business rearrangements 
which have the effect of creating redundancies. The 
remainder of the paper addresses the lack of a mandatory 
period of notice; and the lack of rules relating to the 
transfer of business undertakings. Both are deficiencies 
which should be eliminated by statutory provisions. While 
they do not cover the whole of the problems posed they do 
provide examples of two weaknesses in the current law. 
Mandatory notice periods 
In most respects New Zealand law accords with the inter-
national standards in Parts I and II of ILO Convention 158 
relating to tennination of employment, although not Part 
m on redundancy The exception, which relates to all 
tenninations including redundancy, is that in New Zealand 
there is no entitlement to either reasonable notice or 
redundancy compensation.4 1bis fails to accord with 
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Article 11 of the Convention which povides that a worker 
shaJJ be " ... entitled to a reasonable period of notice or 
compensation in lieu thereof'. nor Article 12 which relates 
to severance allowances. 
At present, workers potentially face a double-edged sword. 
When an employer is in severe financial difficulty, em-
ployees may know nothing of this situation until faced with 
little or no notice of redundancy. In the worst case the 
employer may immediately go into liquidation. In such 
cases, if no redundancy pay offer is made, an action for 
unjustifiable dismissal is pointless as the Court, looking at 
the employer's situation. will not make an award of com-
pensation. Thus employees suffer detriment from both the 
suddenness of their redundancy and the lack of redun-
dancy compensation. Some of this detriment would be 
alleviated if there was a mandatory period of notice. If this 
prziod was reasonably substantial, say four to eight weeks, 
it would allow employees greater time to adjust to the 
dismissal in both financial and psychological terms. It 
would also provide time to look for alternative employ-
ment There appears to be support for the proposition that 
reasonable advance notice (two months) is effective in 
reducing re-employment earnings losses and the probabil-
ity of post-dismissal unemployment (Nord, and Yuan 
Ting, 1991). If, as seems likely, employers cut back on 
redundancy compensation the unwillingness of some, and 
the inability of others, to compensate means that the 
detriment suffered by redundant workers should be allevi-
ated by other means. A mandatory notice period would 
provide at least a minimal degree of protection. 
Transfers of undertakings 
Employers in New Zealand recently lost an effective tool 
for reducing conditions and wages when the partial lock-
out was outlawed. 5 It is possible, therefore, that they will 
attempt to use other means to achieve the same ends. One 
such possibility is to take advantage of company law to 
organise corporate structures with many small associated 
companies and then liquidate them should changes to the 
worldorce or employment conditions be desired. The 
absence of redundancy law regulating transfers of under-
takings allows the exploitation of such methods. Another 
development likely to exacerbate this deficiency is the 
increased freedom in relation to company restructurintl 
and the influx recently of multi-national companies. These 
two factors are likely to increase in the number of mergers 
and takeovers, the very thing which precipitated the Euro-
pean Union and United Kingdom moves to protect em-
ployee • s interests in this context (Bourn, 1983 ). 
The consequences of restructuring can have quite different 
impacts depending on the means adopted. Whenever an 
employer disposes of the business undertaking to a third 
party. employee • s positions effectively become redundant 
as contracts of employment are legally non-transferable, 
whether or not a new owner is prepared to hire the employ-
ees on the same terms and conditions. This does not, 
however, apply in the situation of a simple transfer of 
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company shares as the same legal identity of the employer 
is retained. In practice, however, the transfer of company 
shares may in practice result in a very different type of 
employer. A transferee company may bring in a totally 
new management team. amend the constitution, and change 
the whole nature of the business. The non-contractual 
work situation (voluntary overtime, fringe benefits and 
promotion) may be unilaterally changed. In the absence of 
statutory protection to the contiary, employees will be 
powerless to legally stop this and will have little or no input 
into their destiny. Problems may also arise should a 
transferorfail to make an offer of compensation to employ-
ees (assuming there is no contractual obligation) in situa-
tions where complex arrangements involving exchanges 
of shares for assets or liquidation of the parent company is 
involved. The transferor company may become an empty 
shell devoid of assets, yet remain the nominal employer 
and thus have no funds with which to pay compensation. 
The Transfer Of Undertakings (Protection of Employ-
ment) Regulations 1981 which operate in the United 
Kingdom may give some guide to possible reform. These 
essentially comply with EU Council Directive 77/187, and 
contain a duty for employers to inform and consult with 
employees about impending transfer of undertakings. 
Furthermore, in relation to transfers of subsidiary compa-
nies by receivers and liquidators in "hiving down" situa-
tions, employees still remaining in the employment of the 
parent company are automatically transferred to the sulr 
sidiary upon its sale. Hence they are acquired as employ-
ees by the third party purchaser. In this way the employees 
are protected from technical redundancy. 
United Kingdom style regulation of 'hive downs' would go 
a long way towards protecting against artificial redundan-
cies. The regulations provide that the dismissal " ... of any 
employee of the transferor ... either before or after a rel-
evant transfer is an 'unfair dismissal' if the ... principal 
reason for the dismissal is the transfer or a reason con-
nected with the transfer ... ... But it will not be 'unfair' if the 
dismissal was for a substantial (economic or organisa-
tional) reason. It is arguable that a similar provision would 
give protection against some types of the employer tactics 
mentioned above. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion of current redundancy law identifies 
deficiencies amenable to statutory reform. While the 
current legal situation gives a degree of protection to some, 
and in practice a very small minority, of workers most 
workers are left to cope as they can. At a time when 
Australia has seen fit to legislate towards meeting its 
international obligations 7 criticism of the New Zealand 
Government for not taking its international obligations 
and reputation seriously is particularly pertinent. The 
theory that the market will provide the best solutions is not 
tone that is universally observed. The past year has been 
marked by much legislative activity directed towards new 
statutory protection: for consumers under the Consumer 
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Guarantees Act and for financial infamation users as a 
result of the Financial Reporting Act Notably absent 
however, has been any attempt to affad extra employment 
protection, or infonnation, for workers. In his dissenting 
judgment in Bilderbeck Richardson J suggested "previous 
long service, loss of future benefits for which the worker 
has not yet qualified and the limited financial resources of 
the employee during any ensuring unemployment as well 
as the intangible impact of loss of job secmity are consid-
erations which a just employer should have in mind in 
implementing the redundancy decision in a fair and sensi-
tive way." It is apparent employer• swill not always do so. 
Statutory reform would ensure they did 
Future research 
Redundancy is of course only one aspect that requires 
consideration as part of an active labour market policy. 
Nevertheless it is one that is central to labour market 
flexibility if workers who become redundant in one area 
are to be employed in another. The appropriate degree of 
legal intervention depends on the identification of factors 
that will smooth this process. A degree of equity and 
income smoothing are likely to be among these. At the 
same time the degree to which redundancy costs inhibit 
employers should be identified. Facts rather than rhetoric 
might be useful here. It is also important to mesh labour 
law with company law so as to minimise technical and 
artificial redundancies or the use of company law to avoid 
existing (or reformed) legal obligations. A sensible ap-
proach to redundancy law reform requires information and 
input from all disciplines represented at this conference. 
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